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CASE NOTES
TORTS-IMMUNITY OF A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONAPPLICABILITY AS TO DUTY IMPOSED
BY CITY ORDINANCE
Plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell on a defective sidewalk
adjoining property owned by a charitable organization. The city had provided, by ordinance, that the owner of the abutting property maintain
and repair the sidewalk. Lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff and
granted defendant charitable corporation's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Held: Affirmed. A charitable corporation may not
be held liable for its negligence, even though the negligence is in violation of a municipal ordinance. Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 84 A.2d 328
(Pa. 1951).
A charitable organization, though not generally liable for its negligence,
is liable for the violation of an ordinance. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930). Exceptions to
non-liability have been made conditional upon an ordinance designed to
preserve public safety and convenience. Hord v. City of Ft. Myers, 153 Fla.
397, 13 So.2d 809 (1943). A charitable corporation is liable for violations
of an ordinance relating to safety devices. Susman v. Y.M.C.A. of Seattle,
101 Wash. 487, 172 Pac. 554 (1918); Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. 744 (1891) (streets and highway repair);
Wilkinsburg v. Home for Aged Protestant Women, 131 Pa. 109, 18 Atl.
937 (1890) (footwalk maintenance) ; Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Reformation, su pra, (unlighted stairways) ; Kellog v. Church Charity
Foundation, 112 N.Y.S. 566 (1908) (negligence in operation of ambulance) ;
Bruce v. Central Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907)
(defective scaffold) ; Abston v. Waldon Ocademy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S.W.
351 (1907) (failure to provide fire escapes). A charitable corporation is
liable for violations of ordinances created to preserve the public health.
Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S.E. 525 (1921). The
charitable institution must obey an ordinance created for the promotion
of public morals. State v. Woodrf
if, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So.2d 704 (1943);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1924).
An ordinance tending to promote the general welfare of the community
creates liability for a non-conforming charitable group. Berea College v.
Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 (1906) ; McMasters v. State, 21
Okla. Crim. Rep. 318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922). Ordinances designed to abate
a public nuisance apply to charitable corporations. Rosehill Cemetery Co.
v. Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933); Jones v. City of Moultrie, 72
Ga. App. 282, 33 S.E.2d 561 (1945). Furthermore, an ordinance designed
to preserve public safety, convenience, health, morals or general welfare,
applies to all political, social, or religious organizations. Hord v. City of
Ft. Myers, supra. A minority view is that a charitable corporation is not
liable even in violation of a city ordinance. Quinlan v. St. Joseph's Church,
Troy, 291 N.Y.S. 394 (1936); Jackson v. Goodwill Industries, 46 Ga. App.
425, 167 S.E. 702 (1933).
The fictions manufactured to allow tort immunity for charitable organi(341)
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zations seem to be fading out. A majority of the courts hold such groups
liable when the ordinance of a city casts a specific duty upon the group.
The holding in the principal case is now one of a minority. The liability,
denied in the principal case, is being extended to allow those injured because of the violation of an ordinance to recover against a charitable organization.
LEAH FARB CHANIN

TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-RIGHT
TO SUE

OF SURVIVOR

Defendant shot and killed his wife. Plaintiff, his stepdaughter, sued him
under the Mississippi wrongful death statute which in effect stated that
where death of one person is caused by another, a right of action inures
to a member of deceased's immediate family if deceased could have recovered had he survived. Defendant contended that this action could not
be maintained as his marriage relation precluded his wife from suit and her
survivor was likewise barred. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. Daughter could bring death action against stepfather even though mother would not have been able to sue stepfather for
assault had she lived. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 54
So.2d 476 (Miss. 1951).
At common law there was no right of action either by husband or wife
against the other for a personal tort. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,
;31 S.Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1153 (1910). The common
.law principle of non-liability for a tort committed by either spouse was
.based on the doctrine that husband and wife were one person. Leonardi v.
Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925). This rule arose to preserve the unity of man and wife and the peace and tranquility of the home
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591, 33 A.L.R. 1388 (1924). By
virtue of emancipation acts first enacted in 1844 and subsequently adopted
in all American jurisdictions, a married woman became endowed with the
separate ownership and control of her own property and the right to sue
and be sued. PROSSER, TORTS § 99 (1941). But in the matter of personal
torts the majority view is that neither spouse may sue the other for assault
regardless of what the statutes provide. Thompson v. Thompson, supra.
This view has been criticized by some of the leading legal writers, McCurdy. Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1030 (1930); PROSSER, supra. The courts have considered the danger of
fictitious and fraudulent claims by a wife against her husband, Abbott v.
Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877), but fraud should not be presumed in a familial relationship. McCurdy, supra. The minority view holding that spouses may sue eath other for personal torts has a substantial
following. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 69 (1931). The
majority view has prevailed because of its historical background and
nothing more. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
At common law where A's tortious act caused the death of B the tort died
with B. Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brownl. 205, Yelv. 89 (1607). But the
development of the law gave rise to a more liberal trend, highlighted by
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Lord Campbell's Act of 1846 (9 & 10 Vict., c. 93), giving next of kin the
right to sue for wrongful death. This act has been called "the product of
an enlightened public conscience." Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Co., 101 N.J.L. 393, 127 Atl. 558 (1925). The Mississippi Death Statute follows the general practice of allowing recovery by next of kin only
where deceased could have recovered had he lived. MIss. CODE, § 1453
(1942). Courts applying similar statutes have denied a right of recovery
against the estate of the husband for wrongful death, Wilson v. Barton,
153 Tenn. 250, 283 S.W. 71 (1925); Hovey v. Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212
N.W. 553 (1927), while others have upheld the right to sue. Robinson v.
Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S.W. 1074 (1920); Welch v. Davis, 101 N.E.2d
547 (Ill. 1951).
The instant case is one of first impression in Mississippi. In his opinion
Commissioner Ethridge says, "The reasons for the rule of immunity between husband and wife do not exist where the husband kills his wife and
thus destroys the marital relationship." The court attempts to follow
precedent in finding that the common law disability of a wife to sue a
husband still exists, then goes on to say that the disability has been extinguished because the marital relation has been destroyed. By virtue of
Miss. CODE, § 452 (1942), husband and wife may sue each other. It seems
reasonable to assume that a disability on the part of'-the wife to sue did
not in fact exist. The court has thus reached a desirable end in an awkward manner.
BERTRAM H. RAPOPORT

TORTS-FALSE IMPRISONMENT-ACCOMPLISHED
BLOCKING DRIVEWAY

BY

Plaintiff was delinquent on a furniture loan made by defendant. Defendant's agent came to plaintiff's home to collect or reposses furniture
and parked his car so as to block the exit from plaintiff's driveway, telling
plaintiff in abrupt and gruff manner that she must stay there until truck
arrived to remove the furniture. Plaintiff asked on two occasions if she
might leave. The agent refused permission and she concluded from his
attitude that he would not remove his car if requested to do so. Plaintiff
was pregnant and fearful of her condition, which was known to agent. It
appears that the agent left plaintiff's premises, during the period of her
detention, and went next door to obtain food for himself. The truck arrived
three hours after the agent's arrival and took the furniture. The agent
then left. Trial court found for the defendant. On appeal, Held: Reversed.
Words or conduct furnishing a reasonable apprehension on the part of
one restrained that he will not be allowed to depart is sufficient to support
a finding of false imprisonment, even though there is no actual physical
restraint. Schanafelt v. Seaboard Finance Co., 239 P.2d 42 (Calif. 1951).
False imprisonment always includes at least a technical assault. Hoffman v. Clinic Hospital, 213 N.C. 669, 197 S.E. 161 (1938). A technical
assault is defined as a threat or attempt to interfere with one's sense or
feeling of physical security and to put one in fear for his safety. State v.
Barkas, 191 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937). An actual physical restraint,
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whether by force or fear, is also essential to a false imprisonment. Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850, 10 S.E.2d 76 (1940). Submission
must be to reasonably apprehended force where no force or violence is
actually used. Parrish v. Boysell Mfg. Co., 211 N.C. 7, 188 S.E. 817 (1936).
There is not the essential constraint of liberty, if a way of escape, available without peril of life or limb, is left open. Furlong v. Gernan-Amcrican
Press Ass'n., 189 S.W. 385 (Mo. 1916). The fact that one considers himself restrained is not sufficient unless he apprehends a resort to force upon
an attempt to assert his liberty. Hoffman v. Clinic Hospital, supra. To constitute false imprisonment by words alone, the words must be such as the
person allegedly imprisoned feared to disregard. Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123
Mont. 308, 213 P.2d 237 (1949). Submission to the mere verbal directions
of another, unaccompanied by force or threats of any character, cannot
constitute false imprisonment. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Demont, 224 S.W. 520
(Tex. 1920).
It does not appear that any threat, nor words which might have led the
plaintiff to a reasonable belief that violence or force would have been used
to prevent her departure, were used by the defendant's agent in the instant
case. Further, the agent left plaintiff in order to procure food for himself,
apparently leaving plaintiff unguarded with a safe and certain way of
escape open to her, in addition to those which were afforded by the lack of
physical restraint upon her. While some courts hold that one may be falsely
imprisoned merely by being deprived of his means of transportation, it
is submitted that the end attained in the instant case exceeds the designed
aim and purpose of the rules relating to false imprisonment. While interests
wrongfully invaded in all cases are entitled to protection, modern law
provides adequate remedies, suitable to the facts and circumstances, which
more nearly accomplish justice for all concerned without resorting to a
warping of the formula to fit the facts.
DANIEL J. PIPPIN

TORTS-MENTAL SUFFERING-RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR
MENTAL ANGUISH CAUSED BY WITNESSING
INJURY TO ANOTHER
Plaintiff's petition alleged that he purchased a bottled soft drink, which
contained a decomposed foreign substance, and gave it to a fellow employee
who drank it and was made violently ill, being seized with great bodily
pain and other physical symptoms so severe as to cause plaintiff to suffer
great mental and physical shock. Petition dismissed on the ground that
it did not state a cause of action. Held: Affirmed. Recovery may not be
had for mental anxiety and anguish which is not produced by, connected
with, or the result of, some physical suffering or injury to the person enduring the mental anguish. Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
235 P.2d 948 (Okla., 1951).
The right to maintain an action may not be predicated upon a mental
or emotional disturbance alone. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S.
612, 36 S.Ct. 410, 60 L. Ed. 825 (1916). There may be recovery for mental
suffering when there is a "technical impact", Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669
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(1901), or when physical injury accompanies the mental suffering, Morcelle v. Teasley, 72 Ga. App. 421, 33 S.E.2d 836 (1945), or when the act
complained of was an intentional or wilful wrong. Digsby v. Carrol Baking
Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948). The rule denying the right
to maintain an action is most frequently applied in cases where the act
complained of is caused by the defendant's negligence. Francis v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078, 25 L.R.A. 406 (1894).
A few courts have allowed recovery when the negligence of the defendant
was the proximate cause of the mental suffering to the plaintiff. Orlo v.
Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941). When the emotional
disturbance was caused by another's danger, or sympathy for another's
suffering, the courts have quite generally not allowed recovery. Hinnant v.
Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). There have
been exceptions even to this rule, Cohen v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App.
Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1914), but to come within the ambit of these
cases, the plaintiff himself must have been within the zone of apprehensible physical danger and the endangered third person must be a member
of the plaintiff's family. Wanbe v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497, 98 A.L.R. 394 (1935). The English courts have allowed recovery when
the plaintiff was not within the zone of danger. Hanbrook v. Stoke Bros.,
1 K.B. 141 (1925).
This court followed the majority rules laid down in previous cases and
refused recovery since the act complained of was a result of negligence
and is based on mental suffering caused by witnessing injury to another.
It seems, however, as in other cases of negligence the courts should look
to the duty to use due care, the test of which is found in the foreseeability
of harm that may result if not exercised. By that it is not meant that one
charged with negligence must be found to have foreseen the probability
of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable, but
the test is, whether the ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing
what he -knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the
general nature which resulted was likely to result. If this line of reasoning
had been followed in the instant case the same result would probably be
reached. When, however, the anxiety is not for a third person and the
negligence of the defendant caused the mental suffering to the plaintiff,
unaccompanied by physical injury, this line of reasoning might allow
recovery in some instances where the courts now deny it. Undoubtedly
one, if not the principal, reason why recovery has been denied in cases of
this nature is the feeling that fright and similar emotional disturbances are
subjective states of the mind and difficult properly to evaluate. Therefore,
to permit recovery in such cases would open a wide field for fictitious
claims with which the law cannot satisfactorily deal. Certainly it is a
very questionable position for the courts to take, that because of the possibility of encouraging fictitious claims, compensation should be denied those
who have actually suffered serious injury through the negligence of another. "All in all, it is fair to say that the courts have already given extensive protection to feelings and emotions. They have shown a notable
adaptability in redressing the more serious invasions of the important
interest of personality. No longer is it even approximately true that the
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law does not pretend to redress mental pain and anguish when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone. If a consistent pattern cannot
yet be clearly discerned in the cases, this but indicates that the law on
the subject is in a process of growth." 49 HARV. L. REV. 1067.
WALLACE E. HARRELL, JR.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACTS-LAW GOVERNING
VALIDITY, NATURE AND INTERPRETATION
Plaintiffs entered into an oral contract of employment, in Georgia, with
the defendant company, which was to be performed in the state of Washington. The defedant's agent stated that the employment would last from
three to five years. The plaintiff's had been in the employ of the defendant company six months when they were discharged without cause, and
they sued on the contract. Defendant, by special plea, set up the statute
of frauds as a defense, in that the oral contract was not to be performed
within one year from the date of making. Plaintiffs demurred on the ground
that the contract should be governed by the laws of Georgia, and under
such laws the contract was valid. Demurrer sustained, and defendant appealed. Held: Reversed. Although the contract was made in Georgia, the
validity, nature and obligation of the contract will be governed by the laws
of the state where the contract was to be performed. Dissent: The statute
of frauds relates to remedy and not to substance, and the law of the forum
should apply regardless of where the contract is to be performed. Guy F.
Atkinson Co. v. Fimian, 68 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. App. 1951).
The general view is that the law of the place where the contract was
made governs its nature, validity and interpretation, unless it appears
that the parties intended to be bound by the law of some other jurisdiction.
Janssonv. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950). The place
of making of a contract is where the last act is done which is necessary to
bring a binding agreement into being. Burtis v. Butler Bros., 228 S.W.2d
938 (Tex. 1950). Some jurisdictions follow the theory that where a contract
is to be performed in a place other than where it was made, the place of
performance governs all substantive matters connected with the contract.
Pratt v. Sloan, 41 Ga. App. 150, 152 S.E. 275 (1930). A few courts take the
view that contracts will be governed by the law which was intended by the
parties. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Boseman, 84 F.2d 701 (5th
Cir. 1936). This intention may be expressed, implied or presumed. Mayer
-v. Roche, 77 N.J.L. 681, 75 Atl. 235 (1909). Under the intention theory, the
parties' selection of which law is to govern their contract is limited to a
jurisdiction which has a real connection with the contract. Owens v. Hagenbeck Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158 (1937). The parties in
their selection must act in good faith. Castleman v. Canal Bank & Trust
Co., 171 Miss. 291, 156 So. 648 (1934). The place of contractiic or performance governs all matters of substantive law affecting a contract, but
the law of the forum controls all matters of procedure. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. Froehlich, 60 F. Supp. 902 (D.N.J., 1945). By the term
"substantive law" is meant that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, as opposed to "adjective or procedual law" which pre-
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scribes the method of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion. Maurizi v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 321 Mo. 378, 11 S.W.2d
268 (1928). Many jurisdictions have established the view that the statute
of frauds is a procedual matter rather than one of substance, and the law
of the forum should control its operation. Obear v. First National Bank,
97 Ga. 587, 25 S.E. 353 (1895).
The rules which determine the law governing the construction, validity
and interpretation of contracts are in hopeless conflict, as between the law
of the place of making, place of performance, or that intended by the
parties. The majority opinion in the principal case followed the place of
performance theory, although the modern tendency seems to favor the
governing of the contract by the laws of the place where it was made. The
dissent in the principal case was based on the holding in Obear v. First
National Bank, supra, and the rule laid down in that case still appears
to be the law in Georgia today. The majority opinion ,however, made no
mention of the Obear case, and held that the statute of frauds was a matter
of substance rather than procedure. It seems that the Obear case was
binding on the court and the dissent should have prevailed.
GEORGE S. CARPENTER, JR.

ADOPTION-DISCRETION-ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY TRIAL
COURT IN DENYING ADOPTION
Child was placed with petitioner by the mother nine days after its birth
in November, 1943. The child has enjoyed excellent care in petitioner's
home as evidenced by testimony of witnesses, scholastic record and general
health. The real mother has twice consented to adoption and the only
opposition is on the part of the State Department of Social Welfare on
the grounds that the petitioner is unstable because of six prior marriages
and eleven months served in the Missouri State Prison on a charge of
being an accomplice to murder. Since 1939 petitioner has had no police
record and married her present husband in 1940. Lower court denied petition for adoption and petitioner appealed. Held: Reversed. Where the only
opposition to the adoption was that of the Welfare Department and their
objections were solely on the ground of alleged instability of adoptive
mother because of events occurring eleven years prior to petition, refusal
to grant petition was abuse of discretion when the evidence showed that
the best interests of the child would be served by allowing the adoption.
Adoption of Lingol, 237 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1951).
Adoption was know to the ancients of Greece and Rome but unknown to
the common law of England, and exists in this country only by virtue of
statute. 1 AM. JuR., Adoption § 3 (1936); Helms v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446,
14 S.W. 930, 10 L.R.A. 535 (1890). The Welfare of the child is the primary
consideration in providing for his adoption. Eggleston v. Landrmt,
210
Miss. 645, 50 So.2d 364 (1951). The court must be satisfied that the best
interests and welfare of the child will be promoted by the Adoption. Anderson v. Barkman, 72 A.2d 709 (Md. 1950). The burden of proof is upon
the petitioner to establish facts justifying adoption. Mastrovich v. Mavric,
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66 S.D. 577, 287 N.W. 97 (1939). Considerable liberality should be allowed
in inquiring into the fitness and character of petitioners seeking to adopt.
Dodt v. Werner, 340 Ill. App. 224, 91 N.E.2d 452 (1950). In the absence
of showing of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, his
decision will not be disturbed on appeal, 2 CJ.S., Adoption § 41, and the
appellate court should not weigh the evidence or substitute its discretionary
judgment for that of the trial court. In re Martin's Adoption, 76, Cal. App.
2d 133, 172 P.2d 552 (1946). The lower court may use the discretion according to the circumstances of the particular case, the child's welfare
being the chief consideration. State ex rel Hardesty Sparks, 28 Tenn. App.
329, 190 S.W.2d 302 (1945). Parental love and affection as well as material and economic factors must be considered. In re Hogue, 41 N.M. 438,
70 P.2d 764 (1937). The review on appeal is limited to determining whether there is any evidence to support findings and ultimate conclusions of
the lower court. In re Davies Adoption, 353 Pa. 579,.46 A.2d 252 (1946).
Findings of a county judge who saw and heard witnesses are persuasive
on appeal. In re Mayfield, 158 Ore. 409, 76 P.2d 984 (1938). The appellate
court cannot review the merits, but it may inspect the record to ascertain
whether the lower court exceeded its legal discretion. In re Young, 259
Pa. 573, 103 Atl. 344 (1918). Conclusion of State Department of Public
Welfare that child's best interests required that adoption not be granted
is entitled to great weight. Allen v. Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 44 S.E.2d
500 (1947). The chancellor can authorize adoption of child over the arbitrary refusal of the county home or the Welfare Department to consent
to the adoption. Lewis v. Louisville and Jefferson County Children's Home,
309 Ky. 655, 218 S.W.2d 683 (1949).
On first blush it would appear that the appellate court here was in the
minority in reversing the lower court who found in favor of the State
Welfare Department, but upon a deeper examination of the case it seems
the appllate court was justified in reversing if it was of the opinion that
the lower court abused its discretion. However, cases in which the recommendations of the Welfare Department are not followed are relatively rare
as such approval or disapproval is usually the deciding factor.
C. WALLACE WHITE

CORPORATIONS'-INHERENT AUTHORITY OF CHAIRMAN OF
BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO MAKE CONTRACTS
Plaintiff contracted with the chairman of the board of directors of defendant corporation to procure a purchaser for certain corporate property.
The plaintiff alleged that he fully performed and that the defendant refused to pay the agreed commission. The defendant demurred generally
on the ground that no facts had been alleged which indicated the authority
of the chairman of the board of directors to make the contract. Demurrer
sustained. Held: Affirmed. The chairman of a board of directors does not
have inherent authority to make contracts for the sale of corporate property. Rothberg v. Manhattan Coil Co., 66 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. 1951).
There is little authority on the powers of the chairman of a board of
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directors. In many instances, the chairman of the board is also the president of the corporation, and, when a question of his authority arises, the
courts usually discuss only the authority that inheres in the office of president. The courts generally hold that the president, by virtue of his office,
has no greater power than any other director to act for the corporation
and bind it in dealings with third persons. Baum v. Nord, 88 Ind. App.
647, 164 N.E. 294 (1928). He is not ipso facto in control of corporate
property. Nicky Bros. v. Lonsdalc Mfg. Co., 149 Tenn. 391, 258 S.W. 776
(1924), and by virtue of his office alone he has no authority to contract
for the sale of corporate property not manufactured, produced, or held
by the corporation for sale. Brown v. Bass, 132 Ga. 41, 63 S.E. 788 (1908).
Property interest of a corporation can only be transferred by the board
of directors or some agent duly authorized to act for it. Dickinson Island
Land Co. v. Hill, 210 Mich. 53, 177 N.W. 142 (1920). An agent, however,
may acquire a power to bind the corporation through implied authority or
through a course of dealing. Hale-Georgia Minerals Corp. v. Hale, 83 Ga.
App. 561, 63 S.E.2d 920 (1951) ; Lindale Co-Operative Store v. Ailey, 32
Ga. App. 30, 122 S.E. 718 (1924). For instance, an agent has implied
authority to perform all acts which are incidental and necessary to carrying on that part of the business of the corporation for which he is responsible. Slagle v. Peyton, 182 La. 358, 162 So. 12 (1935). Some courts
have held that contracts entered into by the president are binding on the
corporation if the directors have intrusted him with the management of
the corporation over a long period of time. Potts-Thompson Liqnor Co. v.
Potts, 135 Ga. 451, 69 S.E. 734 (1910) ; Newton v. Social Circle Cotton Mill
Co., 174 Ga. 320, 162 S.E. 667 (1932). And there seems to be a modern
trend toward holding that contracts or acts of a president in the ordinary
course of business will be presumed to have been performed within his
authority unless the contrary be shown. Electronics Development Co. v.
Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130 (1947).
The principal case follows the general rule that officers of a corporation
do not, by virtue of their offices, have authority to conduct corporate business. Their authority is restricted to duties granted in the charter, bylaws, or resolutions of the board of directors. Even if this court had been
inclined to follow the modern trend, the chairman still would not have had
authority to enter into the contract here because the contract was not in
the ordinary course of business. The court was, therefore, correct in sustaining the demurrer.
JOHN

T.

OGLESBY

TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-RAILROADS
Plaintiff's husband was killed while driving a truck, at night, by striking
a three-foot platform attached to the front of a railroad engine. Deceased
had decreased his speed and was attempting to go around the engine which
was parked at the crossing. The trial court overruled the railroad's demurrer to the petition an dthe railroad brought error. Held: Reversed. The
truck driver's negligence in failing to avoid injury was the sole proximate
cause of death and the widow could not maintain the action. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Dolan, 67 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 1951).
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In all actions against a railroad company for damages done to persons
or property, proof of injury inflicted by running of locomotives or cars
shall be prima facie evidence of want of reasonable skill and care on part
of servants of the company in reference to such injury. GA. CODE ANN., S.
94-1108 (Supp. 1951). However, this is only a rule of evidence and can be
overcome by the introduction of evidence of the exercise of reasonable skill
and care on the part of servants of the railroad. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Martin, 79 Ga. App. 194, 53 S.E.2d 176 (1949). See also Western and
Atlantic R. v. Gray, 172 Ga. 286, 157 S.E. 482 (1931). Where damages
are proved to have been from operation of railroad cars, a presumption of
negligence arises against the railroad, and the injured party may recover
unless the railroad carries the burden of showing damage was caused by
plaintiff's negligence, or railroad was not negligent, or, if so, the injured
party could have avoided injury by exercising ordinary care. Collier v.
Pollard, 60 Ga. App. 105, 2 S.E.2d 821 (1939). However, a motorist's contributory negligence will not bar recovery from the railroad for his death
in a crossing collision unless his negligence is equal to or greater than
negligence of train operators. Gay v. Sylvania Central R. Co., 79 Ga. App.
362, 53 S.E.2d 713 (1949). Negligence and diligence have been considered
by Georgia courts as questions exclusively for the determination of the
jury. Where the injured party slowed to fifteen miles per hour, expecting
a train, and then collided with a parked train, the court said that it could
not hold, as a matter of law that the petition failed to show negligence by
the defendant railroad, nor that it affirmatively appeared that the plaintiff,
if negligent, was so negligent as to be barred from a recovery. Central of
Ga. Ry. Co. v. Heard, 36 Ga. App. 332, 136 S.E. 533 (1927). In Southern
Ry. Co. v. Lowry, 59 Ga. App. 109, 200 S.E. 553 (1938), the injured stopped
the auto and then started up, striking the railroad car. The court affirmed
a verdict for the plaintiff, saying that "questions as to diligence and negligence, including contributory negligence (proximate cause), being peculiarly for the jury, we cannot say that the jury were not authorized to
find a verdict for the plaintiff." A gradual withdrawal from this judicial
attitude regarding the highway-railroad intersection type of injury is
manifested in the more recent decisions. Where an auto struck a train the
court affirmed sustaining of a general demurrer, holding that plaintiff's
injuries were, as a matter of law, caused solely by negligence on the part
of the driver of the auto in which plaintiff was riding as a guest. Halhlman
v. Powell, 60 Ga. App. 339, 4 S.E.2d 104 (1939).
Today, the failure of the railroad to install safety devices, such as lights,
watchmen, gates, etc., is not indicative of negligence by the railway and
does not preclude the auto driver from being the sole proximate cause of
his injuries when colliding with a train at a crossing. Evans v. Georgia
Northern R. Co., 78 Ga. App. 709, 52 S.E.2d 28 (1949). Georgia, it appears,
is becoming less inclined to allow juries to be the sole arbiters between her
citizens and the railroads. The appellate courts, albeit belatedly, are rapidly
destroying this source of "smart money," long regarded as the most vulnerable of the corporations so afflicted. The principal case seems to be a continuation of this trend.
JOHN M. ROBBINS
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF INNKEEPER
FOR ACTS OF TRANSIENT GUESTS

The plaintiff, an innocent passerby, sued to recover damages for injuries
sustained when she was struck by flying fragments of a bottle thrown from
a third floor window of the defendant's hotel by a sailor guest. The hotel
clerk had been informed twice by other guests that the sailor guests were
causing a loud disturbance. He warned the sailors once to cease the disturbance, and receiving no further complaints from the other guests, he
took no more action. From a judgment of involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Evidence presented questions for the jury as to whether the hotel clerk was
negligent in failing to do more than warn guests after being repeatedly
advised that they were causing a disturbance and whether such negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Holly v. Meyers
Hotel & Tavern, Inc., 83 A.2d 460 (N.J. 1951).
At common law, subject to certain exceptions, the tenant, and not the
landlord of a building, is prima facie liable for injuries occurring to third
persons through negligent acts of the tenant. Keely v. O'Conner, 106 Pa.
321 (1884). This is true for example where a child of a tenant negligently
knocks a stone from a building onto a passerby. Scullin v. Dolan, 4 Daly
(N.Y.) 163 (1871). The fact that the owner occupies a part of the house
raises no presumption of liability against him for an injury to third persons through negligence of the tenant. Wolk v. Pittsburgh Hotels Co., 284
Pa. 545, 131 Atl. 537 (1935). However, an innkeeper must protect strangers
from acts of his transient guests while in the hotel if he knows, or if, as
a reasonable man, he could have foreseen, the acts of the guests, Brunner v.
Seelbach Hotel Co., 133 Ky. 42, 117 S.W. 373 (1909) ; Gore v. Whitmore
Hotel, 229 Mo. App. 910, 83 S.W.2d 114 (1935). The question arises as to
the narrow zone between the right of a transient hotel guest to the free
enjoyment of his room and the right and duty of the inkeeper to remove
him when he causes a disturbance. The contract right of a transient guest
in a hotel includes the right to immunity from rudeness, personal abuse,
and unjustifiable interference of the innkeeper. Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass.
499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921). However, when a guest in a hotel creates a disturbance, and no longer acts with due regard to others, the proprietor may
expel him. Hutchins v. Durham, 118 N.C 457, 24 S.E. 723 (1896). The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in an action against a hotel
for injuries sustained by a third party when hit by an object falling from
the hotel unless the plaintiff can show exclusive control of the hotel over
the falling object and that the object would not have fallen had the innkeeper used ordinary care. Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 83 Cal. App. 2d
210, 188 P.2d 513 (1948). An innkeeper is under no duty to inspect for
bottles or other articles left on window sills by transient guests, and is
not liable for the injury to third persons through their falling unless he
knows or should have known of such conditions, and then only if he fails
to take immediate steps to remedy the danger. Wolk v. Pittsburgh HotelsCo., supra. An innkeeper cannot be held liable for an injury caused by a
guest's throwing a bottle off a roof garden if the guest had not been bois-
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terous and if it was not foreseeable that he would throw the bottle, Bruner
v. Seelbach Hotel Co., supra.
The question in this case seems to be whether or not the concept of foreseeability should be extended to include the liability of an innkeeper for
injuries to third persons through the acts of his transient guests. The great
majority of the courts have held, along with this case, that the doctrine
of foreseeability should be extended in determining the liability of the innkeeper for negligence.
CHARLES DENT BOSTWICK

CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-INTERPRETATION
OF REASONABLENESS
Ancillary to the sale of a barber shop to plaintiffs, the defendant, an
employee, was required to sign along with his father, the owner, an agreement that he would not engage in the trade of barbering within a certain
radius for a fixed period of time. Plaintiff sues for an injunction restraining the defendant from practicing the trade of barber in the town of Newington. There was no finding that the defendant was active in the management of the barber shop or that the public had been led to believe that
the barber shop was either in whole or in part owned by defendant. Lower
court held for defendant. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. In no event could
the covenant be valid unless it was reasonably necessary for the fair and
just protection of the good will of the business sold, and no such necessity
had been shown. Domurat v. Mazzaccoli, 84 A.2d 271 (Conn. 1951).
A covenant in restraint of trade between employer and employee is valid
only where the restraint is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
business. R. L. Guttridge, Inc. v. Wean, 8 N.J. Super. 450, 73 A.2d 284
(1950). A covenant between the seller of a business and the buyer is valid
only on the same condition. Wood v. McKinney, 205 Ga. 370, 53 S.E.2d 684
(1950). Courts make a distinction in cases where they must determine the
reasonableness of a restrictive covenant as between buyer and seller and
those covenants ancillary to an employment contract. Orkin Exterminating Co. of South Ga. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 51 S.E.2d 669 (1949).
Restrictive covenants of employment are tested by the same standard of
reasonableness of the restraint as are similar covenants in a contract of
sale, but covenants of the former sort are not viewed by the courts with
the same indulgence. 17 C.J.S. 636, Contracts, § 254. Greater scope as to
permissible restraint in contract between vendor and vendee than between
employer end employee is recognized. Betten Co, v. Brauman, 218 Wis. 203,
260 N.W. 456 (1935). In contracts for sale, the restrictions add to the value
of what the vendor sells and the vendee buys, and the parties are more nearly on a parity in ability to negotiate than in the case of such restrictions in
a contract between employee and employer. Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams,
94 Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541 (1919). Public policy requires that a man be
able to sell in the most advantageous manner; therefore, it is necessary
that he should be able to preclude himself from entering into competition
with the purchaser. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed.
271, 46 L.R.A. 122 (1898).
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The courts consider restraint reasonable where it covers the territory of
business sold; or in the case of an employee, restraint covering personal
contracts. This allows greater restraint between vendor and vendee than
employer and employee although the same standard, that of reasonableness,
is applied. After noting that the exact question of whether a covenant not
to enter a competing business made by a mere employee of the seller of a
business is binding on the employee has not before been presented to any
court of last resort in the country, the court properly held the restraint
unreasonable. Even less restraint should be permitted here than in employer and employee contracts. The defendant is not in the position of the
vendor who increases the value of the business sold or the employee who
increases the value of his services by the restriction. The defendant has
restricted the use of his labor, skill and talent with no benefit flowing to
himself. Any such covenant made by an employee in similar circumstances
should be held unreasonable.
JACK G. MCKAY
HUSBAND AND WIFE-TENANCY BY ENTIRETY-EVICTION
OF MOTHER-IN-LAW
Plaintiff husband and his wife were the owners of a family dwelling
house as tenants by the entirety. Plaintiff husband sued in ejectment to
evict defendant, plaintiff's mother-in-law, from his home, and for injunctive relief and damages resulting from the defendant's presence in the
home and for withholding of possession thereof from plaintiff. Held: The
complaint states a cause of action for eviction but not for damages. Fine v.
Scheinhaus, 109 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Supp.Ct. 1952).
An estate by the entirety is an estate held by husband and wife together
during their lifetime, and after the death of either, by the survivor so long
as the estate lasts. 26 AM. JUR., Husband and Wife, § 66 (1940). The
married women's property acts operated only upon property which was exclusively the wife's, and were not intended to destroy the legal unity of
husband and wife, or to change the rule of the common law governing the
effect of conveyances to them jointly. Beach v. Hollister, 3 Hun. (N.Y.)
519 (1875). Contra: Robinson's Appeal, 88 Me. 17, 33 Atl. 652, 51 Am. St.
Rep. 367, 30 L.R.A. 331 (1895), stating that the rule of the common law
creating estates by the entirety is irreconcilable with both the letter and
the spirit of the married women's acts. A conveyance to a husband and
wife as such, creates an estate by the entirety. Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N.Y.
152, 44 Am. Rep. 361 (1883); Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337,
30 L.R.A. 305, 43 Am. St. Rep. 762 (1895). The parties become tenants in
common or joint tenants of the use, each being entitled to one-half of the
rents and profits during the joint lives, with power to each to dispose of
or to charge his or her moiety during the same period, with the right of
survivorship still existing as at common law. Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42
N.J.Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695, 59 Am. Rep. 52 (1887); Hiles v. Fisher, supra.
Contra: McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. St. 39 (1870), holding that the rents
and profits follow the nature of the estate and can neither be disposed of
nor changed except by the joint act of both husband and wife. The wife
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is entitled to occupy the whole of the real estate held by the entireties to
the exclusion, during her natural life, of a purchaser on execution sale of
her husband's interest, so long as there are no rentals received therefrom.
Finnegan v. Humes, 163 Misc. 840, 298 N.Y.S. 50 (Sup.Ct. 1937), mod'd and
aff'd as mod'd, 252 App. Div. 385, 299 N.Y.S. 501 (Sup.Ct. 1937), aff'd, 277
N.Y. 682, 14 N.E.2d 389 (Ct. App. 1938); McCurdy v. Canning, supra.
"The property belongs as much to the wife as to the husband, and she has
just as clear, undoubted, and equitable a right to the use and enjoyment
of the property during the existence of the marriage, as she has to succeed
to the estate upon the death of her husband." Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind.
391, 408 (1871).
In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
actually ousted him or did some other act amounting to a total denial of
his right of possession. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 1004 (1920). To maintain an action of ejectment between persons having a common or joint interest, there must be an ouster of the person seeking relief. Finnegan v.
Humes, supra; Gilman v. Gilman, 111 N.Y. 265, 18 N.E. 849 (1888). While
parties are living together as husband and wife, neither can oust the other
as a squatter. Cipperly v. Cipperly, 104 Misc. 434, 172 N.Y.S. 351 (County
Ct. 1918). The husband may still be the head of the family without being
in any legal sense the possessor or actual occupant of the house or land
in or upon which the family reside. Martin v. Rector, 101 N.Y. 77, 4 N.E.
183 (1886). The husband may, without joining the wife, maintain an action
of trespass against a stranger for injury to an estate held by the entirety.
Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. St. 176, 44 Am. Dec. 117 (1845). The husband may, without joining the wife, maintain an action for damages to the
realty, although title to the realty be in the husband and wife as tenants
by the entirety. Sheridan Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Pearson, 19 Ind. App. 252,
49 N.E. 357, 65 Am. St. Rep. 402 (1898); West v. Aberdeen, etc., R. Co.,
140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477, 6 A. & E. Anno. 360 (1906).
In the principal case, it would seem that the mother-in-law could occupy
the premises so long as she did not deny the plaintiff his right of possession
in the home, and so long as her daughter consented to her occupancy. Such
questions present issues of fact, and in an action of ejectment all issues
of fact must be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived or a reference
is directed. N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 425 (1920). It would also seem
that the law applicable to estates by the entirety could be improved in New
York by legislation. The husband and wife are no longer one person in the
eyes of the law. This assumption formed the fictitious basis of the rule
relating to such estates. The basis for the rule was thus removed by the
married women's property acts; therefore the rule itself should fall. The
Court in the principal case says that the state of the law relating to such
estates in New York is uncertain. The legislature of the state could easily
remedy this situation by abolishing estates by the entirety altogether and
enacting legislation whereby a conveyance to husband and wife would
create the same estate in the parties as if it had been made before coverture.
MAX REGINALD MCGLAMRY

19521

CASE NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-JURISDICTION
DETERMINED BY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Plaintiff sued her husband for divorce on grounds of abandonment and
non-support. Defendant was domiciled in Missouri, but was in the Navy
and stationed in California. They were married in Arizona on October 9,
1949, but due to the shortage of housing accommodations it was necessary
for her, to return to Tennessee. From then until the bill for divorce was
filed, he did not communicate with her or send her any part of the government allotment he was receiving. In May, 1950, while in Tennessee,
she telephoned the defendant in California and he stated their marriage
was a mistake, that he did not love her, and would not live with nor support her, and asked her to get a divorce. A month later the defendant went
to Tennessee and reaffirmed his statement made over the telephone. The
Chancellor found that neither of the parties was a resident of Tennessee
and dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiff appealed.
Held: Reversed. The defendant in the course of the telephone conversation
effected an act of abandonment in Tennessee, and such act having occurred
within the state, and the plaintiff being a bona fide citizen of Tennessee
when the bill was filed, the statute requiring two years of residence before
filing the bill was not applicable. Holman v. Holman, 244 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn.
1951).
Abandonment or desertion consists of two essential elements, the end of
cohabitation, and the offending party's intent to desert. Miller V. Miller,
153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927). The actual separation and the intent must
be present at the same time, and abandonment is complete when the two
coincide. Crumlick v. Crumlick, 164 Md. 381, 165 Atl. 189 (1933). A refusal
of a wife living in one state by mutual agreement to live with her husband
in another state gives a cause of action for divorce in the husband's state
at the time of the refusal. Snook v. Snook, 234 Ky. 314, 28 S.W.2d 1 (1930).
The question in the principal case was whether the act of abandonment was
completed in California, where the words were spoken, or in Tennessee,
where they were heard .Decisions in other fields of law on the completion
of an act are in hopeless confusion. A telephone call from Honolulu to California in a conspiracy to violate the White Slave Traffic Act is sufficient
to constitute an overt act and the defendant could be tried in California,
even though he was not physically within the jurisdiction at the time of
the act. Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937). Criminal
libel is composed of two elements, the writing of the prohibited words and
the publication of the writing, -and the crime is not completed where the
words are formulated, but at the point where they are heard or read by a
third person. Hachney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 45 S.E.2d 241 (1947).
In legal contemplation a person in one state shooting at a man in another
accompanies the bullet until it strikes, and only be tried in the second
state. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984, 22 L.R.A. 248, 44 Am. St.
Rep. 75 (1893). The act is nothing more than an attempt until the bullet
comes into contact with the body. States v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602,
28 L.R.A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822 (1894). In the field of contracts, the majority view is that an offer is accepted and the contract is complete when
the acceptance is telegraphed or deposited in a mail box. Burton v. United
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States, 202 U.S. 344, 36 S.Ct. 688, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Am. Cas. 362 (1906) ;
Morello v. Growers Grape Products Ass'n., 82 Cal. App. 2d 365, 186 P.2d
463 (1947). But the Tennessee courts have implied that the receipt of the
acceptance is necessary since under a Post Office Regulation change made
in 1913, the acceptor does not lose control of the acceptance because he can
withdraw it from the mails after depositing it. Traders National Bank v.
First National Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977, 9 A.L.R. 382 (1920).
Acceptance over the telephone is of the same effect as if the acceptance
had been mailed or telegraphed. Carow Towing Co. v. The "Ed. McWilliams," 46 D.L.R. 506 (1919). One view is that acceptance by telephone is
the same as an oral acceptance when the parties are in the presence of each
other. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS. § 65.

It appears that in most fields of law, the results of the act must take
effect before the act itself is completed. An exception is in the field of contracts, and as has been pointed out, the Tennessee courts follow this principle even in contracts law. It is submitted that the Court in this case
properly held that the act of abandonment completed when the plaintiff
heard the defendant's words, i.e., in Tennessee. Regardless of when the
intent to abandon plaintiff arose in the defendant's mind, it was not manifested until she heard the words. And the courts have no way of ascertaining an intent until it is manifested.
WILLIAM K. BUFFINGTON

